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SOME REALISM ABOUT CORPORATE 
CRIME 
JAMES D. NELSON* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
A lot can happen in twenty years. Since publication of the Holder Memo in 
June of 1999,1 we have experienced recurring corporate misconduct, from the 
accounting frauds at Enron and WorldCom, to the BP oil spill, to the Volkswagen 
emissions scandal. At least in part due to ongoing frustration with such 
misconduct, we have also seen multiple efforts by the Department of Justice to 
update, tweak, clarify, or refine the U.S. government’s approach to the problem 
of corporate crime.2 Last, but certainly not least for purposes of this Article, we 
have seen the reemergence of interest among criminal law scholars in how to deal 
with the “special nature” of the corporate person.3 
The revival of interest in the nature of the corporate person has not been 
limited to criminal law scholars. Indeed, at least when it comes to popular 
perception, the issue of corporate personhood in criminal law has been of 
secondary importance. In 2010, the United States Supreme Court decided 
Citizens United v. FEC,4 which held that the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution protects the right of corporations to spend unlimited amounts 
of money on politics.5 And in 2014, the Supreme Court decided Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc.,6 holding for the first time that for-profit corporations are 
eligible to claim religious exemptions from general laws.7 Together, Citizens 
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 1.  See Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Att’y Gen., to All Component Heads and 
U.S. Att’ys on Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999) [hereinafter Holder 
Memo on Prosecuting Corporations], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/ 
2010/04/11/charging-corps.PDF [https://perma.cc/2YNX-KBW5]. 
 2.  See Resources, CORP. PROSECUTION REGISTRY, http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-
prosecution-registry/browse/resources.html [https://perma.cc/KH3H-3MAD] (featuring links to 
Department of Justice documents related to federal corporate prosecution guidelines). 
 3.  The Holder Memo uses this phrase at the end of its section entitled “Charging Corporations—
Factors to be Considered.” See Holder Memo on Prosecuting Corporations, supra note 1. 
 4.  558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 5.  Id. at 365–66. 
 6.  573 U.S. 682 (2014). 
 7.  Id. at 692. 
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United and Hobby Lobby have begotten a revival of historical debates about 
what rights the corporate person should enjoy.8 
In these debates, there appears to be a widely shared intuition that issues of 
corporate personality in criminal law, on the one hand, and in constitutional law, 
on the other, are closely related.9 Both involve questions about the moral status 
of corporations and how the law should treat them in light of that status. And yet 
the possibilities for intellectual arbitrage between the two fields have not been 
fully exploited. This Article seeks to take a step in that direction. 
More specifically, this Article aims to distill some lessons from those who 
have adopted and advanced a realist approach to questions of corporate rights.10 
Following critiques of corporate theory in the early decades of the twentieth 
century, especially the powerful arguments offered by John Dewey, the realist 
approach to rights seeks to bracket—or at least to deflate—the intractable 
debates about the corporation’s metaphysical status. In their place, realists about 
corporate rights have urged that we take a pragmatic approach that focuses on 
the “concrete facts and relations” that should guide the law’s treatment of 
corporations.11 
In the remainder of this Article, I will try to synthesize four lessons from 
realists about corporate rights and suggest how they might be leveraged by 
scholars of corporate crime. Part II is about the needless invocation of abstract 
concepts in reasoning about corporate entitlements. This lesson is likely most 
familiar to scholars of corporate crime, but the persistence of conceptualism 
 
 8.  The literature in this area is vast. A search of Westlaw’s Law Reviews & Journals database for 
“corporate personhood,” for instance, returned 797 results since 2010. Search Results for “Corporate 
Personhood” since 2010, Secondary Sources – Law Reviews & Journals, WESTLAW, 
https://1.next.westlaw.com/Search/Home.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=%28sc.Default%
29 (select “Secondary Sources” from the drop-down menu in the main search bar; type “corporate 
personhood” into the search bar and press enter; set date range from “01/01/2010”). An identical search 
in Google Scholar returned 3,640 results since 2010. Search Results for “Corporate Personhood” since 
2010, GOOGLE SCHOLAR, https://scholar.google.com/ (type “corporate personhood” into the search bar 
and press enter; then set custom date range from 2010 to 2020). 
 9.  See, e.g., N. Craig Smith, Introduction: The Moral Responsibility of Firms: Renewed Interest in a 
Perennial Question of Business Ethics, in THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS 1, 2 (Eric W. Orts & 
N. Craig Smith eds., 2017) (“Recent court cases in the USA, that seem to give corporations rights of 
religious expression and freedom of speech normally reserved for individual human beings, also heighten 
the importance of [corporate blame, punishment, and deterrence] questions.”); Eric W. Orts, Conclusion: 
The Moral Responsibility of Firms: Past, Present, and Future, in THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS, 
supra, at 206, 214 (discussing “[t]he recent high-profile US Supreme Court case of Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc. (2014), which recognized a right of some family-owned firms to resist legal obligations 
on religious grounds”). 
 10.  See, e.g., Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Some Realism about Corporate Rights, in 
THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 345 (Micah Schwartzman, Chad Flanders & Zoe 
Robinson eds., 2016); James D. Nelson, Conscience, Incorporated, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1565 (2013); 
Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH. L. REV. 1629 (2011). Although the 
legacy of legal realism is contested, this Article focuses on realist arguments that have appeared in the 
corporate rights literature, especially those made by scholars following John Dewey. 
 11.  John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655, 673 
(1926). 
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about the corporate person recommends at least a brief rehearsal of the main 
lines of argument. 
Part III addresses the related, though importantly distinct, question regarding 
what should replace conceptualism about corporations once the realist critique is 
absorbed. In other words, the realists were—and are—especially good at 
destruction of airy theoretical concepts, but they are not typically known for their 
constructive suggestions. Is there any positive program that results from the 
realist critique? This Part suggests that there is, at least in the sense of outlining 
an appropriate methodology to answer questions about corporate entitlements. 
Part IV then engages the most overtly critical aspect of the realist tradition, 
namely, the idea that abstract concepts are not only indeterminate, but also serve 
as vehicles in which parties to a particular “struggle” smuggle their ideological or 
political priors.12 The argument in this Part focuses on the ways in which 
conceptualism about corporate personality has led to cooptation by powerful 
business interests, and how continuing to propound such conceptualism only 
invites further appropriation. 
Finally, Part V addresses the ultimate realist question: What are we supposed 
to do about corporate crime? It does not attempt to provide a solution by 
prescribing a particular course of reform. Instead, it offers something more in the 
way of a modest caution against proposals that would seek to radically restructure 
the corporation. Considering the failures of corporate criminal law over the last 
twenty years, the impulse to seek such radical reforms is understandable. But, in 
the realist spirit, I argue that we ought to have a practical accounting of likely 
costs and benefits before we abandon core features of the corporate form. 
II 
REALISM ABOUT PERSONHOOD 
In the corporate rights literature, Citizens United rekindled interest in 
theories of corporate personality.13 The case involved a constitutional challenge 
to a federal law prohibiting corporations from spending treasury money on 
certain kinds of political communications.14 The opinion itself was largely 
agnostic on deep questions of corporate personhood, resting much of its weight 
on the argument that the First Amendment protects listeners’ right to hear 
messages conveyed by corporations.15 This approach, moreover, aligned with the 
 
 12.  See id. at 665. 
 13.  See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the Corporate Form, 2010 Wis. L. Rev. 999 
(2010). 
 14.  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 318–19 (2010) (describing the provision of the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act that prohibited corporations and unions from using treasury funds for 
“electioneering communications”). 
 15.  See id. at 336–66; see also id. at 465 n.72 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Nothing in this analysis turns 
on whether the corporation is conceptualized as a grantee of a state concession, a nexus of explicit and 
implicit contracts, a mediated hierarchy of stakeholders, or any other recognized model. . . . It is not 
necessary to agree on a precise theory of the corporation to agree that corporations differ from natural 
persons in fundamental ways, and that a legislature might therefore need to regulate them differently if 
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Court’s longstanding preference for focusing on the constitutional interests of 
individuals rather than on the nature of the corporation.16 Nevertheless, in 
scholarly as well as popular conversations, Citizens United functioned as an open 
invitation to revisit debates about corporate personality. 
Those debates were once prominent in the legal and philosophical literature. 
They typically involved controversies about whether the corporation was a 
concession of state power, an aggregation of individual stockholders, or a real 
entity with its own independent standing in the political community.17 But these 
debates were intractable and interminable—the discourse about corporate 
personality seemed as fruitless as it was “endless.”18 And although it took at least 
a few years to sink in, the conventional historical view is that John Dewey’s 
intervention was a “stunning eulogy” that put these debates to rest for decades 
to come.19 
In his analysis of the ongoing debates, Dewey took pains to show that theories 
of corporate personality are indeterminate.20 These theories, he argued, could 
just as easily be invoked by one side of any controversy as by the other. This 
flexibility—or flippability—was due to the fact that abstract theories about the 
nature of corporations do not contain normative premises to evaluate corporate 
treatment. To be sure, Dewey was attentive to the possibility—indeed, the 
likelihood—that such theories could be deployed effectively by those who argued 
for certain policy positions. In that way, they might be thought to have some 
argumentative “tilt.”21 But on Dewey’s account, the theories themselves do not 
have any independent normative purchase. Theories of corporate personhood, in 
other words, do not provide reasons for supporting one side or the other. Those 
reasons must come from elsewhere, and the various theories were simply 
conceptual vehicles in which to smuggle one’s policy preferences.22 
Drawing on Dewey’s insights, contemporary corporate rights scholars have 
urged that we avoid reviving moribund questions about corporate personhood.23 
Those theories, as Dewey showed, are not helpful in determining how the law 
should treat corporations or in determining what kinds of entitlements they 
should have. On this view, it is best to skip—or to bracket—deep metaphysical 
 
it is human welfare that is the object of its concern.”) (internal citations omitted); Kathleen M. Sullivan, 
Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143, 155–58 (2010) (arguing that both the 
majority and the dissent in Citizens United emphasized listeners’ interests). 
 16.  See Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature of Corporate Constitutional 
Rights, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673 (2015). 
 17.  See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 
W. VA. L. REV. 173 (1985); Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the Business Corporation in 
American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441 (1987); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE 
L.J. 201 (1990). 
 18.  See Max Radin, The Endless Problem of Corporate Personality, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 643 (1932). 
 19.  Mark, supra note 17, at 1480. 
 20.  See Nelson, supra note 10, at 1572–74 (discussing Dewey’s indeterminacy critique). 
 21.  For an argument along these lines, see Horwitz, supra note 17, at 175–76. 
 22.  See Nelson, supra note 10, at 1573. 
 23.  See sources cited supra note 10. 
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questions about corporate personality and to get right to the pragmatic task of 
evaluating the concrete social facts and relations that obtain in the real world. 
Much as in the corporate rights literature, questions about corporate 
personhood have enjoyed a similar revival among those concerned with the 
problem of corporate crime.24 The bulk of this revival revolves around the 
question whether corporations are moral agents.25 For proponents of moral 
agency, the basic argument typically goes something like the following. 
Corporations are capable of recognizing and conforming their behavior to a set 
of morally relevant obligations. Given this capacity to respond to moral 
reasons—that is, to function in the space of obligations—corporations are 
“conversable” agents. And in virtue of this status as conversable agents, we are 
then justified in thinking of corporations as “persons.”26 
This functional personhood, in turn, is said to make corporations suitable for 
certain responsibilities.27 Since they can respond to moral obligations, that is, it 
makes sense to impose those moral obligations upon them. And since the 
criminal law is one important means of enforcing moral obligations, corporations 
are fit to be held criminally responsible.28 To put these points together succinctly, 
characterizing corporations as persons makes it appropriate to subject them to 
certain liabilities, including criminal liabilities.29 
To be sure, this schematic argument has not gone without vigorous challenge. 
Some commentators contend that corporate moral agency is an illusion or, at 
best, a metaphor standing in for the real behavior of human beings.30 Others resist 
 
 24.  See Mihailis E. Diamantis & William S. Laufer, Prosecution and Punishment of Corporate 
Criminality, 15 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 453, 455–56 (2019) (discussing recent literature). 
 25.  See, e.g., THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS, supra note 9. 
 26.  See CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILIP PETTIT, GROUP AGENCY: THE POSSIBILITY, DESIGN, AND 
STATUS OF CORPORATE AGENTS 174–78 (2011); see also Philip Pettit, The Conversable, Responsible 
Corporation, in THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS, supra note 9, at 15, 23 (“That corporations and 
other such bodies are conversable agents means, in quasi-legal parlance, that they are persons.”). 
 27.  See Pettit, supra note 26, at 32. 
 28.  Pettit is perhaps more cautious in this final conclusion, though he does say, “I believe that their 
fitness to be held responsible . . . argues for the appropriateness of holding corporations responsible in 
the criminal law.” Id. at 33. Other scholars who follow his basic argument about functional or “pragmatic” 
personhood, however, have been more decisive in concluding that corporations should be held criminally 
responsible. See, e.g., W. Robert Thomas, How and Why Corporations Became (and Remain) Persons 
Under the Criminal Law, 45 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 479, 504 (2018) (“I disagree that legal personhood is 
insufficient to give rise to criminal liability. What it means to be a legal person is to be able to participate 
in the space of legal rights and obligations, which includes being held responsible for violating these 
obligations. One paradigmatic feature of that space is criminal law and punishment.”). 
 29.  See John Hasnas, The Phantom Menace of the Responsibility Deficit, in, THE MORAL 
RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS, supra note 9, at 89, 98 (“[T]he reason why the corporate moral responsibility 
debate is such a lively one is that most of the advocates of corporate moral responsibility believe that it 
is important to be able to impose punishment on corporations as collective entities, and they recognize 
that moral responsibility is necessary for such punishment.”); see also id. (“A just legal system imposes 
criminal sanctions only on morally responsible agents. Therefore, moral responsibility is (or should be) 
a prerequisite for criminal punishment.”). 
 30.  See David Ronnegard & Manuel Velasquez, On (Not) Attributing Moral Responsibility to 
Organizations, in THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS, supra note 9, at 123, 139 (criticizing 
“collectivist” accounts of corporate moral agency). 
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the argument from personhood on the grounds that corporate criminal liability 
imposes vicarious punishment on innocent stakeholders.31 These skeptical 
accounts, however, seem to share the basic assumption that some form of 
personhood is necessary to justify corporate criminal liability.32 These skeptics 
may contest the idea that corporations are persons, but they seem to concede that 
this “threshold question” has significant implications for how the law should treat 
them.33 
It is at this point that the realist’s “cynical acid” might be most useful.34 In 
recent years, realists about corporate rights have reminded us that one need not 
answer metaphysical questions about the corporation’s status to determine how 
they should be treated.35 Descriptions of the nature of the corporation do not 
produce the normative premises necessary to make arguments about corporate 
entitlements. Those premises can only come from an investigation of the values 
and interests that we care about as a political community—that is, from our 
political morality.36 Those underlying principles of political morality will then 
drive our conclusions about whether and how the law—including the criminal 
law—might be deployed to vindicate our values. 
 
 31.  See Hasnas, supra note 29, at 97–102. 
 32.  See id. at 99; see also Ronnegard & Velasquez, supra note 30, at 140 (arguing that moral agency 
is “necessary for moral responsibility”). 
 33.  See Diamantis & Laufer, supra note 24, at 455 (discussing the “threshold questions of agency”); 
see also DAVID RONNEGARD, THE FALLACY OF CORPORATE MORAL AGENCY 5 (2015) (arguing that 
conclusions about the moral agency of corporations have “important wider ramifications”); Thomas 
Donaldson, Preface to THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS, supra note 9, at v (“[T]he arcane, 
abstract issue of moral agency has weighty practical consequences . . . .”). 
 34.  See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897). The 
basic realist point—that claims about corporate personhood are not necessary to make determinations 
about how corporations should be treated—is not entirely absent from the criminal law literature. 
Indeed, Steven Walt and William Laufer made a version of this argument nearly three decades ago. Why 
Personhood Doesn’t Matter: Corporate Criminal Liability and Sanctions, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 263 (1991). 
In their article, they defended the claim that “imposition of corporate criminal liability does not require 
references to persons or features peculiar to individuals.” Id. at 264. Although their arguments rested on 
the logical relationship (or lack thereof) between ontological status and normative conclusions rather 
than on appeals to pragmatism, their conclusions are consistent with those reached by the realists. Their 
article is cited often in debates over the moral status of firms, but its important lessons typically go 
unheeded. 
 35.  See sources cited supra note 10. At first glance, it would appear that John Hasnas has argued 
along similar lines. Indeed, Hasnas invoked another famous legal realist—Felix Cohen—to argue that 
theories of corporate personality are “transcendental nonsense.” See John Hasnas, Where is Felix Cohen 
When We Need Him?: Transcendental Nonsense and the Moral Responsibility of Corporations, 19 J.L. & 
POL’Y 55, 58 (2010). But Hasnas goes on to make a stronger ontological claim when he insists that the 
corporation is “not a thing,” and then infers from that idea a further normative claim that we should not 
recognize corporate criminal liability. See id. at 69. This method of reasoning, however, runs contrary to 
the realist account I rehearse above. On that account, the corporation may or may not be “a thing”—that 
is a deep and difficult question of metaphysics that we are not yet in a position to resolve confidently. 
But regardless of how—or whether—we resolve that question, we can still make normative claims about 
how corporations should be treated by the criminal law based on the interests and values we identify as 
important to our political morality. The question of corporate personhood, that is, can simply drop out 
of the analysis. 
 36.  See Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 10, at 368. 
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A defender of corporate personhood might respond in the following way. For 
the criminal law to work—that is, to achieve its goals, whatever they may be—we 
need to know that the corporation is the kind of thing that can respond to its 
injunctions. On this view, if the corporation is not a moral agent in the sense that 
it can function in the space of obligations, then it makes no sense to subject it to 
criminal sanctions. 
It may be true that you need to make some claims about the nature of 
groups—what they are and how they function—to explain complex social 
behavior. This is a question about the best theory of social scientific description, 
and for this question, it is quite possible that methodological individualism is 
mistaken. But explanations of corporate behavior do not provide justifications 
for how corporations should be treated. That is, social scientific descriptions of 
how corporations function do not provide reasons for treating them one way or 
another. Those reasons can only come from moral and political theory. And it is 
perfectly plausible to say that, as a matter of moral and political theory, we should 
punish corporations (or not punish them, as the case may be) regardless of 
whether they count as persons.37 
In short, following renewed interest in corporate personhood after Citizens 
United and Hobby Lobby, realists about corporate rights have reminded us of 
Dewey’s admonition to focus on the facts and interests at play rather than on 
whether the corporation counts as a person. The problem of corporate 
personhood may present intriguing metaphysical questions, but, lucky for us, we 
need not wait until those questions are resolved to decide how the law should 
proceed. Instead, deep disagreements about corporate status can simply be put 
to the side as we deliberate about what to do with corporations. These insights 
would seem to apply just as forcefully in the context of designing and 
implementing corporate criminal law as they do in the context of corporate rights. 
III 
REALISM ABOUT CORPORATIONS 
Realism has always been particularly good at telling us what not to do. We 
shouldn’t treat the law as if it were a matter of deductive logic. We shouldn’t reify 
concepts. And we shouldn’t pretend that those who use those concepts are doing 
so in a neutral way, without political or ideological motivation. But realism’s 
track record with regard to defining a positive program is more checkered. In 
other words, the realists were particularly good at destruction, not always so great 
at construction.38 
 
 37.  See Amy J. Sepinwall, Denying Corporate Rights and Punishing Corporate Wrongs, 25 BUS. 
ETHICS Q. 517, 527 (2015) (“[W]e might have good reasons to hold corporations responsible for their 
wrongs even if they do not satisfy the criteria for moral agency.”); see also Steven Walt & Micah 
Schwartzman, Morality, Ontology, and Corporate Rights, 11 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 1 (2017) (arguing 
that corporate personhood is neither necessary nor sufficient to determine corporate entitlements). 
 38.  See Nelson, supra note 10, at 1575; see also BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT 
ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 210 (1998) 
(arguing that Robert Hale’s “skeptical, deconstructive analysis offered little guidance” on questions of 
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Does realism about personhood offer any kind of positive program? This Part 
argues that it does, or at least that it points us in the right direction as a matter of 
methodology. The critical strand of realism is well known. Conceptualism about 
law—or about many other things, including morality—is unhelpful, and so we 
should ditch it. But there is another strand of the realist program that seems to 
tell us more about what we should do after we ditch conceptualism. That strand 
of realism, following Dewey again, tells us that we ought to focus on the facts of 
real life. In other words, we should take a social scientific approach to the law, 
bringing an empirical spirit to understanding, and eventually solving, the 
problems that we face.39 
At first glance, however, it is hard to see how social science fits within the 
realist program described in Part II. That is, if we are supposed to start with the 
values and interests that we care about as a matter of political morality, rather 
than on conceptions of the person, then where do the “facts” on the ground come 
in? 
Once again, it seems that realists about corporate rights have provided a 
helpful roadmap. According to this roadmap, deciding how corporations should 
be treated—that is, deciding what entitlements they should have—involves two 
distinct steps. First, we have to determine what values and interests we are trying 
to protect or promote. This is the normative question, to be answered as a matter 
of political morality. 
Once we answer this first question, we then ask: How do those values and 
interests play out in different kinds of organizations, including in corporations? 
And here is where social science becomes critically important. To determine how 
the law might promote certain values and interests, it turns out that we need to 
know a lot about how different organizations and institutions function. And when 
it comes to determining whether corporations will promote the values and 
interests that we have identified as a matter of political morality, we need to dig 
into the institutional details of firms and markets to understand how they work.40 
Sometimes the realist program is misunderstood as being anti-theoretical. 
But the realists about corporate rights have been careful to show that this is not 
the case. The first step of determining corporate entitlements is still a theoretical 
 
policy); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Consent, Coercion, and Employment Law, 55 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
409, 427–28 (2020) (discussing Fried’s analysis of Hale). 
 39.  See Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1240–59 (1985); see 
also Hanoch Dagan, The Realist Conception of Law, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 607, 639 (2007) (discussing 
“the association between legal realism and the mobilization of social sciences for the purposes of legal 
discourse”). For an account of the realist legacy that focuses on naturalism and pragmatism, see Brian 
Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 312 (1997) 
(“The Realists give us the philosophical motivation and cues for how we should proceed, even if they do 
not carry off the project themselves.”). As Leiter points out, Dewey’s pragmatism was closely related to 
his naturalism. See id. at 315 n.206. For an excellent historical overview of the connection between legal 
realism and scientific naturalism, see EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: 
SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 74–94 (1973). 
 40.  See Nelson, supra note 10, at 1573–74; Pollman, supra note 10, at 1670–75; Schragger & 
Schwartzman, supra note 10, at 368–69. 
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one—what are the values and interests that we care about and want to promote 
as a political community? It’s just that the theory involved at this first step is 
moral and political theory, not metaphysics. 
This first step, moreover, is indispensable—we cannot simply skip over it and 
‘get right to the facts.’ And that’s because, as in any area of social scientific 
inquiry, there are an infinite number of facts in the world waiting to be 
discovered. That is, there is an infinite mound of data waiting for the social 
scientist to collect and to investigate. To determine which facts matter—which 
facts are worth collecting and investigating—we need to have a theory of 
relevance. We need to have a theory to identify the questions we are trying to 
answer, which then tells us what kinds of data would help answer those questions. 
For questions of corporate entitlements, that theory comes from our political 
morality, not from corporate metaphysics.41 Or, as Dewey might put it, we need 
to focus on “interests,” not on “beings.”42 
Fortunately, in the literature on corporate rights, we have some exemplars of 
this realist-inspired methodology. To begin with, some scholars have recently 
brought considerable quantitative expertise to the study of corporate rights, 
particularly in the free speech area.43 Others have focused on the historical 
development of corporations, and in particular the rise of the modern, widely 
held public company.44 Still others have highlighted the degree to which 
developments in modern capital markets have come to confound many of the 
 
 41.  See Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 10, at 360; see also Walt & Schwartzman, supra note 
37, at 14 (“moral theory determines the moral significance of facts about corporations with which the 
theory must be consistent.”); Waheed Hussain & Joakim Sandberg, Pluralistic Functionalism about 
Corporate Agency, in THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS, supra note 9, at 66, 69 (“when it comes 
to the important social, moral, and political questions that surround business corporations in 
contemporary liberal democracies, [the] metaphysical or pre-institutional sense of collective agency is 
largely irrelevant.”). For more general statements of this realist methodology, see Hanoch Dagan, 
Doctrinal Categories, Legal Realism, and the Rule of Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1889, 1896 (2015) 
(“[Realists] realize that value judgments are indispensable not only when evaluating empirical research, 
but also when simply choosing the facts to be investigated.”); Dagan, supra note 39, at 649 (“A 
prescription for sensitivity to situations and facts is vacuous without general normative commitments.”); 
see also Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 
849 (1935) (“The collection of social facts without a selective criterion of human values produces horrid 
wilderness of useless statistics.”); id. (“Legal description is blind without the guiding light of a theory of 
values.”); Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. 
REV. 1222, 1236 (1931) (“[V]alue judgments must always be appealed to in order to set objectives for 
[empirical] inquiry.”). 
 42.  Dewey, supra note 11, at 662. 
 43.  See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Shining Light on Corporate Political 
Spending, 101 GEO. L.J. 923 (2013) [hereinafter Bebchuk & Jackson, Shining Light]; Lucian A. Bebchuk 
& Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 117 (2010); 
see also John C. Coates IV, Corporate Speech & the First Amendment: History, Data, and Implications, 
30 CONST. COMMENT. 223 (2015). For the argument that economic analysis of law “is reasonably 
understood as a continuation of the Realist program,” see BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING 
JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 
1, 81–102 (2007). 
 44.  See Pollman, supra note 10, at 1674 (arguing that we must “[take] account of the corporate 
context and the dynamics of people underlying corporations”). 
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traditional assumptions that lawyers and judges make about corporations.45 All 
of these accounts draw heavily on social science; none of them turns on the nature 
of the corporate person. 
Realists about corporate rights have also shown the importance of 
appreciating the diversity of our institutional landscape, including vast 
differences among different kinds of corporations.46 Once again, this realism 
follows Dewey, who saw how concepts like corporate personhood had a tendency 
to flatten the normative universe by yoking together groups that have very 
different social functions.47 Some of the realists about corporate rights have 
focused on the differences between publicly held and privately held 
corporations.48 Others have instead highlighted contrasts between for-profit and 
nonprofit organizations.49 At a time when the instinct to flatten the organizational 
universe is strong,50 and the law has become more receptive to that instinct,51 we 
should not lose sight of deep organizational diversity in the real world.52 
Understanding the many grooves and contours of the organizational landscape, 
in turn, can point us toward a better understanding of which kinds of institutions 
and organizations are good at promoting which kinds of interests. Just as 
importantly, remaining sensitive to the division of institutional labor in society 
can help us determine which kinds of organizations are not well suited to advance 
those social interests.53 
 
 45.  See Anne Tucker, The Citizen Shareholder: Modernizing the Agency Paradigm to Reflect How 
and Why a Majority of Americans Invest in the Market, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1299 (2012); Leo E. Strine, 
Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision Course: The Tension between Conservative Corporate Law 
Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 390 (2015); Leo E. Strine, Jr., A Job Is Not a 
Hobby: The Judicial Revival of Corporate Paternalism and Its Problematic Implications, 41 J. CORP. L. 
71 (2015). 
 46.  See Pollman, supra note 10; Elizabeth Pollman, A Corporate Right to Privacy, 99 MINN. L. REV. 
27, 63–84 (2014) [hereinafter Pollman, Privacy]. 
 47.  See Dewey, supra note 11, at 671. 
 48.  See Elizabeth Pollman, Citizens Not United: The Lack of Stockholder Voluntariness in Corporate 
Political Speech, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 53 (2009); Pollman, Privacy, supra note 46, at 62–84. 
 49.  See James D. Nelson, The Freedom of Business Association, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 461 (2015). 
 50.  See, e.g., Patricia Bromley & John W. Meyer, “They are All Organizations”: The Cultural Roots 
of Blurring Between the Nonprofit, Business, and Government Sectors, 49 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 939 (2017); 
see also M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and the Market for Altruism, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 571 (2009) (arguing against tax law distinction between nonprofits and for-profits that 
perform charitable work). 
 51.  See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 363–64 (2010) (rejecting the relevance of speaker 
identity for purposes of free speech rights); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 710–18 
(2014) (rejecting the proposed line between for-profits and nonprofits for purposes of claiming religious 
liberty rights). But see Nelson, supra note 49 (defending the for-profit/nonprofit distinction in freedom 
of association law). 
 52.  See Pollman, supra note 10, at 1631 (arguing that we need to be attentive to “the realities and 
dynamics of the modern business corporation”). 
 53.  For an argument that for-profit corporations are not well-suited to promote interests of 
conscience, see Nelson, supra note 10. For a discussion of the “institutional division of moral labor,” see 
JOSEPH HEALTH, MORALITY, COMPETITION, AND THE FIRM: THE MARKET FAILURES APPROACH TO 
BUSINESS ETHICS 94 (2014). 
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At this point, a critic might argue that deep disagreement about criminal law’s 
core values poses a problem for translating the realist’s two-step methodology. 
On this view, any attempt to apply the methodological lessons from realists about 
rights would get stuck at step one, where questions about the interests we are 
seeking to promote through the criminal law are deeply contested. If we cannot 
decide whether the criminal law is best justified in terms of consequentialist, 
deontological, expressivist, or other values, the critic might say, then how are we 
supposed to know which facts are relevant at step two? 
But criminal law’s value multiplicity is nothing new for the realist 
methodology.54 To see why, consider that realists about corporate rights have 
made many of their arguments in the context of controversies over free speech. 
The normative grounding of free speech rights, in turn, is at least as contested as 
that of the criminal law. First Amendment scholars have argued that free speech 
promotes, among other things, the values of democratic self-government,55 
checking abuses of power,56 promoting toleration,57 and protecting individual 
freedom of thought.58 The realist method, however, is robust to these varied 
normative interests—that is, it can be applied fruitfully regardless of the 
particular value or combination of values we endorse. To be sure, realists about 
corporate speech rights have to answer a contested question at step one, namely, 
what is the best account of the interests served by the freedom of speech? And 
just as surely, there is bound to be disagreement among reasonable people about 
the normative weight or priority assigned to each value. But it is important to 
keep in mind that the terrain of this contest is political morality, not the nature 
of the corporation. 
The same methodology should apply, mutatis mutandis, to the problem of 
corporate crime. On the first step, we might have serious disagreements about 
criminal law’s normative foundations. But that fight should happen on the terrain 
of political morality, not in the realm of metaphysical concepts. And once a 
reasonable ordering of criminal law’s political values is specified, then it is time 
to draw on the best social science available to help us understand the way those 
values can be promoted in the modern corporate world. 
Indeed, the corporate crime literature already has its own exemplars of such 
a realist approach that jettisons conceptualism in favor of a hard-nosed look at 
 
 54.  For a pluralistic account of criminal punishment, see Michael T. Cahill, Punishment Pluralism, 
in RETRIBUTIVISM: ESSAYS ON THEORY AND POLICY 25 (Mark D. White ed., 2010). 
 55.  See Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477 (2011); 
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948). 
 56.  See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. 
J. 523. 
 57.  See LEE BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST 
SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986). 
 58.  See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27 CONST. 
COMMENT. 283 (2011). 
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the facts and relations on the ground.59 This work shows how fruitful it can be to 
bypass thorny conceptual questions about corporate personality and to take a 
pragmatic pass at the social problems involved in corporate crime. Given the 
warm reception these realist accounts have received,60 then, perhaps it is those 
who work on corporate rights who need most reminding of this second realist 
lesson. 
IV 
REALISM ABOUT RESPONSIBILITY 
Now back to the critical strand of realism. In Part II of this Article, I argued 
that the realists showed us that it is not necessary to answer questions about 
corporate personhood to decide how corporations should be treated. In the 
literature on corporate rights, this realist point means that when we try to 
determine whether corporations should be eligible to claim certain entitlements, 
we need not make any kind of determination about corporate personality. I then 
suggested that, given the recent revival of similar questions in the corporate crime 
literature, scholars working in this area would do well to take a page from the 
realists about corporate rights and avoid unnecessary questions about the nature 
of corporations. 
The advice to avoid unnecessary questions, however, might take a weak form 
and a strong form. The weak form would hold that, since questions about 
corporate personality are unnecessary, we would be best advised to skip those 
questions and move on. In other words, we should simply bracket the deep 
questions that are being asked by the corporate metaphysicians, given that they 
are not likely to be resolved anytime soon and that we are able to go forward and 
function without answering them. Perhaps this is what Dewey had in mind when, 
at the end of his famous essay, he said that if we focus on facts and relations, 
retaining the word person will “do no great harm.”61 
This Part, however, focuses on the stronger form of the critical argument. It 
is one thing to claim that theories of corporate personality are indeterminate, and 
therefore they are not helpful in solving our real social problems. But the realists 
did not stop there. Instead, they were very attentive to the ways in which 
indeterminate concepts can be used as ideological weapons, to be deployed 
according to the “interest and purpose of a writer.”62 Indeed, Dewey was 
 
 59.  For an especially good example, see BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW 
PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS (2014). 
 60.  See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, How Should Prosecutors Punish Corporate Criminals?, NEW 
RAMBLER REV. (June 24, 2015), https://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/law/how-should-
prosecutors-punish-corporate-criminals [https://perma.cc/352P-YJUW] (reviewing GARRETT, supra 
note 59); Jed S. Rakoff, Justice Deferred is Justice Denied, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Feb. 19, 2015), https://www-
nybooks-com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/articles/2015/02/19/justice-deferred-justice-denied/ [https://perma.cc/ 
RB2N-X9SZ] (same). 
 61.  Dewey, supra note 11, at 673. 
 62.  Id.; see also Dagan, supra note 39, at 633 (“[R]ealists typically approach their normative inquiries 
in a critical and pluralistic spirit.”). 
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particularly attuned to the ease with which various theories of corporate 
personhood are flipped to support different ideological or political goals.63 The 
theories of personhood, on this account, are not merely inert or idle distractions. 
They are the tools used by “some party to a struggle” to rationalize their own 
claims of power.64 
In the field of corporate crime, it is not hard to see how discourse about the 
moral agency of firms might be flipped to suit the interests of the powerful. The 
primary goal of those seeking to establish corporate personhood is to close the 
‘responsibility gap.’65 The idea here is that if we can demonstrate that 
corporations are moral agents, then we can show that they are “fit” to be held 
responsible by the criminal law. And if we can show that they are fit to be held 
responsible by the criminal law, then we will have some way to make up for the 
fact that it can be hard to pin responsibility on any particular individual when 
complex organizations misbehave. When we cannot hold individuals responsible 
under the criminal law—and perhaps even when we can—the corporation can be 
a target for our residual store of blame. 
But if we embrace the idea that corporations are moral agents, fit to be held 
responsible by the criminal law, we can easily anticipate how businesses will try 
to flip the argument. For example, if corporations are moral agents that are 
proper subjects for a host of responsibilities, then businesses are likely to argue 
that such moral agency should entitle them to certain claims of dignity and moral 
rights. To put the point another way, if we use the language of personhood to 
bolster corporate responsibility, what’s to stop businesses from using those same 
arguments to fend off the harsh sanctions of criminal law?66 
Indeed, in other areas of the law, we have already seen a similar dynamic play 
out. For decades, scholars and advocates promoted the idea of “corporate social 
responsibility” as a way to tame corporations, particularly those that were 
operating in weak legal environments.67 The basic idea was that if corporations 
could be moralized, then maybe we could avoid some of the abuses of corporate 
power to which we had all become accustomed. But a funny thing happened on 
the way to taming corporations. In recent years, more and more businesses have 
 
 63.  See Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 10, at 358. 
 64.  Dewey, supra note 11, at 665; see also John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L. 
REV. 17, 26 (1924) (observing that “the slogans of the liberalism of one period often become the bulwarks 
of reaction in a subsequent era”) [hereinafter Dewey, Logical Method]. 
 65.  See, e.g., Pettit, supra note 26, at 33 (discussing the “shortfall in the regulatory effects that our 
responsibility practices are generally designed to achieve”); Philip Pettit, Responsibility Incorporated, 
117 ETHICS 171, 194–97 (2007) (discussing the “deficit in the accounting books” that results when only 
individuals are punished for corporate behavior). For discussion of the “responsibility gap” more 
generally, see Samuel W. Buell, The Responsibility Gap in Corporate Crime, 12 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 471 
(2018). 
 66.  See Meir Dan-Cohen, Sanctioning Corporations, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 15, 22–24 (2010) (discussing 
moral reasons for criminal law’s special substantive, procedural, and evidentiary constraints). 
 67.  For an excellent historical overview, see C. A. Harwell Wells, Cycles of Corporate Social 
Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-first Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77 (2002). 
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come to deploy the language of corporate social responsibility not to hold 
themselves to a higher standard, but instead to avoid legal regulation.68 
To take one recent example, in the litigation leading up to Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby, businesses invoked the idea of corporate social responsibility to avoid 
legal requirements to provide their employees with health insurance that covers 
contraceptives.69 The basic structure of the claim went as follows. If businesses 
can have moral responsibilities, as proponents of corporate social responsibility 
had long claimed, then they could also have moral rights to exemptions from laws 
with which they disagree.70 And perhaps not surprisingly, these arguments proved 
successful in the Supreme Court. In his majority opinion, for example, Justice 
Alito observed that if corporations can pursue various socially responsible 
objectives, then “there is no apparent reason why they may not further religious 
objectives as well.”71 This reasoning, in turn, cleared the way for the Court’s 
ultimate conclusion that for-profit companies can claim religious exemptions 
from general laws.72 
This dynamic of co-optation has a long pedigree. Dating back to the Lochner 
era, we saw businesses effectively co-opt the liberal principle of freedom of 
contract and re-direct it to protect their own interests in avoiding commercial 
regulations.73 More recently, we have observed a very similar dynamic, in which 
businesses have flipped the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment 
from a shield for minority and dissenting voices to a tool for aggrandizing 
corporate power.74 In the life of the law, there has been little to stop powerful 
 
 68.  See James D. Nelson & Elizabeth Sepper, Converting Corporate Social Responsibility 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 69.  For a favorable review of these arguments, see Mark L. Rienzi, God and the Profits: Is There 
Religious Liberty for Moneymakers?, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 59 (2013). 
 70.  For other examples of this argumentative strategy, see Brett H. McDonnell, The Liberal Case 
for Hobby Lobby, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 777, 780 (2015) (“Corporations may be used to pursue moral goals 
that aim to make the world a better place—an idea that resonates with the (generally left-of-center) 
corporate social responsibility movement. Where such goals are rooted in religious principles, a 
corporation may, and should, be able to invoke RFRA protections.”); Dylan Scott & Sarah Kliff, Leaked 
Regulation: Trump Plans to Roll Back Obamacare Birth Control Mandate, VOX (May 31, 2017), https:// 
www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/5/31/15716778/trump-birth-control-regulation [https://perma.cc/ 
FH6G-5BAH] (discussing leaked draft of proposed Department of Health and Human Services rule, 
which stated: “Businesses large and small take positions on matters of social justice, community benefit, 
and ethical concerns beyond profit . . . . [T]herefore, the Departments consider it appropriate to exempt 
any entity possessing religious beliefs or moral convictions against the coverage required by the Mandate, 
regardless of its corporate structure or ownership interests.”). 
 71.  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 712 (2014). 
 72.  Id. at 719. 
 73.  See J. M. Balkin, Some Realism about Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First 
Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 383–84 (1990). 
 74.  See id. at 384–85; Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic 
Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1 (1979); Frederick Schauer, First Amendment 
Opportunism, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 175 (Lee C. Bollinger & 
Geoffrey R. Stone, eds., 2002); Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment Expansionism, 56 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1199 (2015); Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133 (2016). 
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forces from appropriating the arguments of their critics and turning them toward 
their own purposes. 
One might object at this point that there is a principled distinction between 
holding corporations responsible and granting them various moral and legal 
rights.75 A proponent of this objection might argue that the same set of moral and 
political values that supports holding corporations responsible for the harms they 
cause does not entail rights claims that augment corporate power.76 Or, in the 
alternative, one might distinguish the moral agency of firms, which makes them 
responsive to certain obligations, and the dignity of individual persons, which 
makes them eligible for criminal law’s special constraints and protections.77 
Both of these arguments are logically sound. But as Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Jr. famously observed, “the life of the law has not been logic: it has been 
experience.”78 Perfectly fine logical distinctions—such as those between rights 
and responsibilities or between agency and dignity—often crumble in the face of 
politics and power. And if there is one thing that our experience with expanding 
corporate rights has taught us, we should think twice before we doubt the power 
of businesses to use any arguments at their disposal to promote their own 
interests.79 
V 
REALISM ABOUT REFORM 
Reflecting on the last twenty years, it is hard not to despair over the prospects 
for reform of corporate criminal law. The standard approaches to the problem of 
corporate crime, including the increasingly technocratic focus on optimal 
deterrence and the design and refinement of intricate compliance programs, have 
come to seem insufficient. Frustrated by the failure of these standard approaches, 
some commentators have begun to entertain more drastic measures. Although 
these measures differ in their details, they are united around the common belief 
that there is something rotten with the corporation itself. If we are ever to make 
any real progress toward eradicating corporate crime, on this view, we need to 
stop looking at problems with particular corporations and start looking at 
problems with the corporation.80 
 
 75.  See Walt & Laufer, supra note 34, at 274. 
 76.  See id.; see also LIST & PETTIT, supra note 26, at 175–85 (arguing that group agency justifies 
special responsibilities but not special rights). 
 77.  See Dan-Cohen, supra note 66, at 44. 
 78.  See O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1881). 
 79.  See generally KEVIN M. KRUSE, ONE NATION UNDER GOD: HOW CORPORATE AMERICA 
INVENTED CHRISTIAN AMERICA (2015); ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN 
BUSINESSES WON THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS (2018). 
 80.  See, e.g., Samuel W. Buell, supra note 65, at 490 (“The problem is the firm.”); SAMUEL W. 
BUELL, CAPITAL OFFENSES: BUSINESS CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA’S CORPORATE AGE 251 
(2016) (“[T]he corporate age has left us with many problems. These include the problem of 
responsibility—of how to hold one another accountable for harms and wrongs—when they’re committed 
within, and seriously enabled by, large nonhuman institutions that are designed to limit responsibility. 
The contemporary pattern of corporate crime prosecutions is evidence for the responsibility deficit, not 
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Once again, scholars working on issues of corporate rights have faced their 
own set of calls for drastic reform. As academic and popular dissatisfaction with 
the rising tide of corporate rights began to grow, particularly in the wake of 
Citizens United, some progressive reformers called for a constitutional 
amendment declaring that corporations are not entitled to constitutional rights.81 
Such proposals gained wide support, both among grassroots groups and among 
prominent public figures. For example, Occupy Wall Street made elimination of 
all corporate constitutional rights a centerpiece of its populist movement.82 And 
wholesale elimination of corporate constitutional rights captured the attention 
and support of several candidates during the 2016 presidential campaign, as well 
as more than a dozen states and over two hundred members of Congress.83 
In response, realists about corporate rights have worked to deflate these 
drastic reforms, calling instead for a more focused inquiry into the practical costs 
and benefits of particular constitutional rights.84 To be sure, this inquiry would 
not seek to deny the real social harms caused by the recent extension of corporate 
rights. Indeed, realists about corporate rights have offered serious and sustained 
critiques of the Court’s reasoning in Citizens United and Hobby Lobby.85 For 
 
its cure.”); David Ciepley, Can Corporations Be Held to the Public Interest, or Even the Law, 154 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 1003, 1013–16 (2019) (arguing that to prevent corporate crime, we need to make some 
fundamental changes to the structure of the modern corporation); STEVE TOMBS & DAVID WHYTE, THE 
CORPORATE CRIMINAL: WHY CORPORATIONS MUST BE ABOLISHED 173 (2015) (“[T]he key task must 
be to attack the legal basis upon which corporate power and irresponsibility is constituted—legal 
personhood, from which follows so many of the features of the corporate form.”); see also Grietje Baars, 
“It’s Not Me, It’s the Corporation”: The Value of Corporate Accountability in the Global Political 
Economy, 4 LONDON REV. INT’L L. 127, 127 (2016) (“[S]ometimes the challenge extends beyond the 
individual corporation to the concept of the corporation per se . . . .”). 
 81.  See, e.g., We the People Amendment, MOVE TO AMEND, https://www.movetoamend.org/ 
amendment [https://perma.cc/D4RL-AERL] (proposing a constitutional amendment stating, “We, the 
People of the United States of America, reject the U.S. Supreme Court’s Citizens United ruling and other 
related cases, and move to amend our Constitution to firmly establish that money is not speech, and that 
human beings, not corporations, are persons entitled to constitutional rights”); The Democracy 
Amendments, FREE SPEECH FOR PEOPLE, https://freespeechforpeople.org/democracy-amendments/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y3S4-HU5T] (expressing support for The People’s Rights Amendment, S. 736, 116th 
Cong. (2019), which declares, in relevant part, that “The words people, person, or citizen as used in [the 
U.S.] Constitution do not include corporations, limited liability companies or other corporate entities . . 
. .”). 
 82.  See WINKLER, supra note 79, at 374–76 (describing an Occupy Wall Street resolution proposing 
that “human beings, not corporations, are persons entitled to constitutional rights, and that the rights of 
human beings will never again be granted to fictitious entities or property”). 
 83.  See KENT GREENFIELD, CORPORATIONS ARE PEOPLE TOO (AND THEY SHOULD ACT LIKE 
IT) 7 (2018). 
 84.  See, e.g., Pollman, supra note 10, at 1663. For extended criticism of proposals to amend the 
constitution to eliminate corporate personhood, see GREENFIELD, supra note 83, at 6–26; Kent 
Greenfield, In Defense of Corporate Persons, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 309 (2015). For an argument that 
logic must be “relative to consequences rather than to antecedents,” see Dewey, Logical Method, supra 
note 64, at 26. 
 85.  See, e.g., Elizabeth Pollman, Constitutionalizing Corporate Law, 69 VAND. L. REV. 639 (2016) 
[hereinafter Pollman, Constitutionalizing Corporate Law]; Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Law and 
Theory in Hobby Lobby, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 149 (Micah Schwartzman, 
Chad Flanders & Zoe Robinson, eds., 2016); Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 10. 
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example, a number of scholars have shown in great detail how the Citizens United 
Court’s casual assumptions about “the procedures of corporate democracy” were 
radically out of touch with the actual facts on the ground in modern 
corporations.86 And others have shown that the Hobby Lobby Court made 
unwarranted—and indeed outright false—assumptions about the impact of 
corporate religious exemptions on the interests of employees.87 
But while recognizing the serious costs of their expansion, realists about 
corporate rights have remained sensitive to their benefits.88 Chief among those 
benefits is the corporation’s right to own property in its own name, separate and 
distinct from the property owned by individual shareholders.89 If corporations 
were to be stripped of property rights, as some reformers appear to prefer, then 
we would lose much of what makes the corporate form such an efficient structure 
for large-scale economic projects. Whatever one thinks about the costs of 
corporate free speech and religious liberty rights, any sober analysis would need 
to consider the downsides accompanying wholesale revocation of corporate 
rights. 
In the remainder of this Part, I suggest that those who propose to reform the 
corporate structure in the name of reducing corporate crime should remain 
similarly attentive to the corporation’s benefits. To be clear, I do not mean to 
suggest that reformers are wrong about the ways in which the corporate structure 
contributes to corporate crime. Indeed, much as it seems plain that there are 
serious costs that have come with the expansion of corporate rights to free speech 
and religious liberty, there are also real costs of maintaining a legal form that has 
been the incubator of so much criminal behavior. Instead, I wish to make the 
more modest point that promoting social wealth through an efficient corporate 
governance system is also part of our political morality, and that we ought to have 
a more fulsome account of the corporate structure’s core benefits before we go 
down the path of drastic reform.90 
Take, for example, the provocative proposal that we abolish the corporate 
form.91 The motivation behind this proposal seems to be the sense that the very 
idea of the corporation as a separate entity is misbegotten. We have erected new 
legal beings, on this account, capable of amassing huge resources and deploying 
them in their own interests. But by breathing life into these new beings, it is said 
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that we have created monsters that we are no longer able to control. The tweaks 
and refinements we have tried over the years, including those in the criminal law, 
cannot save us from these monsters. We need to pull the plug on our own 
creations.92 
To carry the day, however, this reform proposal would need to contend with 
the “essential” contributions of corporate separateness to modern economic 
life.93 The most important feature of the corporate form is that it creates a distinct 
pool of assets that is owned by the firm itself and separates those assets from 
shareholders’ personal property.94 Corporate separateness, in turn, carries 
considerable economic benefits. To begin with, it allows firms to use their own 
assets to bond contracts—that is, firms can pledge their own assets to business 
creditors in assurance that they will satisfy their obligations.95 In doing so, it 
subordinates the claims of shareholders’ personal creditors, which means that 
business creditors need not concern themselves with the personal finances of a 
numerous—and constantly shifting—group of equity investors.96 To properly 
assess the terms on which to extend credit, a creditor can instead rely on 
information about the assets owned by the business itself. Creditors are likely to 
find it much cheaper to monitor these assets, given that they will be more clearly 
delineated and they will be more familiar to creditors. Lowering the cost of 
creditor monitoring, in turn, will allow firms to obtain credit on more favorable 
terms and expand their ability to pursue socially valuable projects.97 
A second economic benefit of corporate separateness is that it prevents 
shareholders—or their personal creditors—from prematurely liquidating firm 
assets.98 In the typical case, the value of a firm is greater as an ongoing business 
than it would be if all its assets were liquidated. But this “going concern” value 
would be in danger if shareholders or their personal creditors had the power to 
suck money out of the firm at will. Such power would not only destroy firm value 
in instances where shareholders actually exercise liquidation authority, but also 
in cases where shareholders leverage the mere threat of liquidation to extract 
private benefits. By blocking this threat of liquidation, corporate separateness 
makes it much more difficult for investors or their creditors to engage in such 
value-destroying practices.99 
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Finally, when a firm owns its own assets and can use those assets to bond 
contracts with firm creditors, shareholders do not have to concern themselves 
with the personal finances of other shareholders.100 That is, the terms that a 
business is able to obtain from its creditors are determined by the assets owned 
by the firm itself, and they do not turn on the personal finances of individual 
investors.101 If things were otherwise, a firm’s cost of capital would depend on the 
creditworthiness of individual investors, and those investors would then need to 
monitor each other so that personal finances do not infect the firm’s own financial 
position. Such monitoring costs—multiplied over each firm in which a 
shareholder invests—would make it more expensive for shareholders to diversify 
their investments. And it would also impair the tradability of corporate shares, 
given that transfers among differently situated investors would affect the value 
of the firm itself.102 
This rehearsal of economic benefits is not meant to be dispositive on 
questions of corporate reform. Instead, the point of detailing some of the 
corporate form’s attractive economic features is to urge a full accounting of both 
the costs and the benefits of the corporate structure. The realists’ plea here, in 
turn, is not that we come to any particular conclusion about how these costs and 
benefits stack up against each other. It is simply that the benefits of corporate 
separateness must be considered alongside its costs when contemplating drastic 
corporate reforms. To return to the theme of this Article, in other words, the 
“facts and relations” that we care about when it comes to thinking through how 
the law should treat corporations include the many ways in which the corporate 
form promotes economic efficiency and social wealth. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
There are some striking parallels between the resurgence of debates about 
the nature of corporations among corporate rights scholars and renewed interest 
in similar questions within criminal law. In the wake of Citizens United and 
Hobby Lobby, questions of corporate personhood took center stage in 
conversations about what kinds of rights corporations should be able to claim. 
Following the methodology recommended by John Dewey in the early twentieth 
century, a small group of scholars revived the realist approach to problems of 
corporate rights. Realists about corporate rights have emphasized the 
indeterminacy of theories of corporate personality. They have recommended an 
empirically informed, social scientific approach to understanding how 
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corporations actually function. At the same time, they have documented a long 
history of businesses coopting discourses of corporate responsibility and using 
them to augment corporate power. And finally, they have urged that efforts at 
legal reform should pay close attention to the benefits that corporations provide 
as well as the costs they impose. 
This Article has suggested that realist arguments about corporate rights, in 
one way or another, can be fruitfully leveraged by those studying parallel 
developments in corporate criminal law. Just as conversations about corporate 
rights have gained clarity and focus from realist insights, so too might 
conversations in criminal law benefit from some realism about corporate crime. 
 
